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NOTES
PERMISSIBLE CONTRACTS IN RESTRAINT OF TRADE.
A and B were non-competing telephone companies occupying
the same field. Each desired to extend its activity through the
territory occupied by the other and to accomplish this they en-
tered into an agreement that each should build to a common
point and that each should use the other's line. They mutually
contracted not to compete with each other, that neither would
compete with or take subscribers in territory occupied by the
other, and that neither would enter into any other contract
impairing any of the privileges and advantages acquired by
the contract between the two companies. Held that this was
not a contract in restraint of trade contrary to the common
law, Wayne Co. v. Ontario Co., 112 N. Y. Sup. 424.
(169)
NOTES
The view that the law has taken in regard to contracts in
restraint of trade has been gradually varied as commercial con-
ditions have changed. In 1415 any contract in restraint of trade
appears to have been void,1 but by 1613 a partial restraint was
permitted.2 In 1711, in the leading early case on the subject,
the doctrine was laid down that there could be a restraint un-
limited as to time though it must be limited as to spaceY The
reason of the rule was that it was necessary in certain cases
to allow such a contract in order to give persons the legitimate
fruits of their toil, such as to allow one to sell the good will of
a business, which would have been impossible had the vendor
been prevented from binding himself not to engage in the same
trade; and in order to facilitate the carrying on of certain busi-
ness relations, such as agencies and apprenticeships, which
could not have been carried on unless the agent or apprentice
had been permitted to bind himself not to use his principal's or
master's trade secrets after the termination of the relation.
4
The limitation as to space was added because it was thought
that a contrary doctrine would cause the expatriation of the
convenantor, he being considered unable to carry on another
trade, and further because it was not necessary for the protec-
tion of the covenantee.3
The final test, however, was laid down to be one of reason-
ableness with regard to (i) the protection of the covenantee,
and (2) any injury the restraint might do the public.' The
legal reason given by Fry, J., for the change of test is that if
you adhere to the rule making all contracts in restraint of trade
over unlimited space bad, you are restraining those which are
reasonable as well as those which are unreasonable, a result
which no one can desire. The political and economic causes
of the change were that owing to modern conditions there was
no danger of expatriation,7 and that because of the shrinking in
size of the commercial world the protection of the covenantee
demanded that the restraint be more extensive than formerly.
8
The rule that the contract must be reasonable with regard to
the covenantee's protection without injury to the public shows
that the main object of the contract must be the protection of
Wald's Pollock on Contracts, Third Ed., by Sam'l Williston, 471.
'Rogers v. Parry, Bulstrode, 136.
' Mitchell v. Reynolds, i P. Wins. 181.
'U. S. v. Addystone, 29 C. C. A. 141 (i898), at p. i5o.
'Roussilon v. Roussilon, L. R. 14, Ch. D. 351 (i88o), per Fry, J.
'Rousston v. Roussilon, L. R., 14 Ch. D. 351 (i88o), at pp. 366-7.
'Lee Herreshoff v. Boutinean, 17 P- I. 3 (i8go), at p. 6.
'Lee Herreshoff v. Boutineau, 17 R. I. 3 (89o), at p. 7.
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the covenantee and the restraint must be ancillary, and that
where this is the case the restraint is permissibleY It has
been held, however, where the main object was the protection
of the covenantee in his purchase of the good will of a business,
that the contract was void as tending to a monopoly.'0
The principal case is well within the rule. Each company
virtually gave its lines over to the other to use as its agent and
necessarily had to protect itself from misuse of the property
by the agent-the main object was protection; and the public
was not injured, especially as the companies were non-compet-
ing, but its convenience was enhanced by the contract.
MAY DAMAGES BE RECOVERED RY A NON-RESIDENT ALIEN FOR
THE DEATH OF A SON?
In the dawn of English law there prevailed a notion that
they, who had an interest in the life of a person, were entitled
to compensation from him who wrongfully caused his death.
The reparaton was known as weregild, and existed under the
early S-Kon l-ws.1 Wh-n the forf'-;ture of goods t- the king
fohoweu all homicide, ttie individual, seeing that no property
remained from which he might satisfy his right, abandoned it.
Thus the enforcement of weregild disappeared from the Eng-
lish law.2 The action of an individual, on the death of another
was recognized, without the pecuniary relief in the appeal of
murder as late as 18i9,s when the statute of 59 George III
abolished this procedure. However vigorous this idea of the
individual right persisted, the maxim of actio personalis inoritur
cur persona crept into the law at an early date and was in-
voked to prevent recovery for the death of a person.4 Not
until Lord Campbell's Act was this relief given. 5 Most Ameri-
can jurisdictions have passed statutes similar in their provisions
to the English act,8 allowing recovery by the kin of the deced-
IU. S. v. Addystone, 29 C. C. A. 141 (x898).
"Lupkin Co. v. Fringeli, 57 Ohio St. 596 (i89S).
'Blackstone Commentaries, 188.
2 Shields v. Yonge, 15 Ga. 349 (1854).
'Ashford v. Thornton, i Barn. and Ald. 4o5 (1818).
'Higgins v. Butcher, i Yel. 89 (i6o6); Carey v. Railroad Co., x
Cush. (Mass.), 1848.
'9 and IO Vict., c. 93 (1846).
'Mass. Stat. 1898 c, 535; Penna., Apr. 15, i85r, P. L. 675, sec. 22.
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ent within certain degrees as husband, widow, children or
parents.
7
The question of whether a non-resident alien may sue under
these statutes has arisen. Two recent cases have passed judg-
ment upon this question. In Fulco v. Schuylkill Stone Com-
pany,8 the plaintiff was a subject of the Kingdom of Italy and
sought recovery for the death of her son whch occurred in
Pennsylvania. The Court followed the interpretation placed
by the courts 9 of Pennsylvania upon their own act and denied
that the scope of the act included non-resident foreigners. The
treaty of Feb. 26, 1871,10 which gave the right to Italian citizens
to resort to the courts to maintain and defend their rights as
freely as natives, was held to apply only to Italians resident in
this country, 1 and not in the slightest degree to vary the deci-
sion of the Court in its interpretation of the Pennsylvania
statute. The reasoning adopted by the Wisconsin 12 and Penn-
sylvania courts, which seem to be alone in their stand is: first,
that their laws have no intrinsic force proprio vigore extra ter-
ritorially; secondly, that statutes apply generally only to those
who owe obedience to. the legislature which enacts them and
whose interest it is their duty to protect; and thirdly, it is
usually required to grant or concede rights to aliens to make
express mention of them. In Mahoning v. Iron and Steel Co.,'2
following the courts of Colorado,"4 whose statute was in ques-
tion a diametrically opposite decision, was reached. At least
a dozen jurisdictions have reached a like conclusion.' 5 The
English courts agreed with the Pennsylvania interpretation,
when the question was first offered for their consideration. 6
A later case, Davidson v. Hill,' has taken a clear dissent from
the earlier case refusing to follow it. It would therefore seem
that such courts as rely upon the early English doctrine are
weakened to a great degree.
'Penna., Apr. 26, 1855 P. L. 3o9.
'163 Fed., x24 (19o8).
'Deni v. Railroad, 181 Pa. 525 (1897): Maiorano v.
R. R., 216 Pa. (I9o7).
1a7 Stat. 845.
"Article 23.
"McMillan v. Spider Lake S. M. Co., 115 Wis. 332.
1163 Fed. 827 (i9o8).
"Hayes v. Williams, 17 Colo. 465 (1892).
" See Patek v. American Co., 154 Feb. 19Ol (907), for
of cases.
"'Adams v. British Steamship Co., 2 Q. B. (898), 430.




The view of the scope of a statute embracing the provisions
of Lord Campbell's Act will depend largely upon the path
taken in approaching the problem. If we regard the object of
the act punitive then the plausibility of including a non-resident
alien is self evident in order to enforce greater efficiency in the
protection of human life. This seems to have been the thought
in Mr. Justice Holmes' mind in affirming the Massachusetts
court 1 8 when he said, "It is primarily a penalty for the protec-
tion of the life of a workman in this state." By a parity of
reasoning a Canadian was allowed recovery in Alabama' 8
under an act to suppress murder and lynching. Other decisions
under acts to augment the safety of mining operations give
this right to a non-resident alien.
20
If we consider the statute as granting a benefit to the rela-
tion of the deceased within certain defined degrees, the ques-
tion of its extra territorial power arises. The Pennsylvania
courts predicate their conclusion on the fact that a non-resident
debtor is not entitled to the benefits of their exemption laws. 2t
The language of the various statutes is broad enough to cover
the non-resident alien, but it is incumbent upon each court to
decide the object of its own act. If we take a retrospective view
of the whole matter, may we not say that these statutes grant
no new right, but simply remove the bar which has crept into
the law when the weregild ceased to be pursued by the in-
dividual, and it was then thoughtlessly said that the common
law supports no action on death? If we answer this in the
affirmative, only one logical position can be assumed, viz.:
that of the majority as represented by Hahoning Co. v. Blom-
felt.
22
THE RIGHT OF A THIRD PARTY CLAIMANT TO ENJOIN AN
EXECUTION SALE.
In Pennsylvania it has long been the practice to allow a
creditor to sell on execution against the lands of the debtor, any
title alleged to be in him, leaving the purchaser of such title to
try the validity of it afterwards in an action of ejectment. In
the recent case of Mantz v. Kistler et al. (70 Atlantic Rep. 545,
X'Mulhall v. Fallon, 54 L. R A. 934 (19o5).
"Luke v. Calhoun, 52 Ala. 115 (1875).
"Kelleyville'v. Petrytis, 195 Ill. 215 (192).
=Collum's Appeal, 2 Penny. 130 (1882).
=163 Fed. 827 019o8).
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decided in the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, May 4, 1908),
it was held that a defendant in execution cannot enjoin, by bill
in equity, a sheriff's sale of his property, on the ground that
he is not the defendant against whom judgment had been ob-
tained, but that another person of similar name is the defend-
ant. By this decision, the proposition is affirmed that a court
of equity has no jurisdiction in such a case, and the present
practice sustained, although criticized by Mr. Chief Justice
Mitchell, who delivered the opinion of the Court. "It is not,"
says the Chief Justice, "the best system, being a makeshift, in
the absence of a court of chancery, for the administration of
equitable principles under the forms furnished by the common
law. The remedy in equity as administered in some jurisdic-
tions, notably our neighboring state of New Jersey, is very
much superior. There the rights of parties are fought out and
adjusted in advance of a sale, so that every claimant or outside
purchaser may bid at the sale with exact knowledge of what
title will pass, and what disposition will be made of the pro-
ceeds; but the other practice has been long established here,
and is only departed from in very clear cases."
In view of the adverse criticism of the Chief justice of the
State, it is interesting to note how the practice apparently grew
up, and to consider the status of equity jurisdiction in Penn-
sylvania. In this State, lands, with certain modificatons, are
chattels for the payment of debts.1 Under the Act of 1705 2
the lands of debtors were made liable to executon, the words
of the act embracing all possible titles. By a later act,3 the
right to levy on and sell the debtor's real estate was affirmed,
and a system of procedure established by means of which this
might be done. And it has always been settled in Pennsylvania
that a purchaser at sheriff's sale takes such title as the debtor
had at the time of judgment.'
The courts in Pennsylvania had practically no equity juris-
diction until 1836. Certain specific equity powers were con-
ferred on the Courts of Common Pleas by an Act of Assembly
passed in that year.5 Under this Act, the courts of Philadel-
phia County were given greater powers than those of the other
counties, although by a later act,6 the courts in the other
counties were clothed with the same equity jurisdiction as
possessed by those in Philadelphia. It was provided that the
'Cowden v. Brady, 8 S. & R. 508.
2 1 Smith's Laws, 57.
'Act of June 16, 1836, P. L. 755, sec. 43.
"Fehley v. Barr, 66 Pa. 196.
'Act of June 16, 1836, P. L. 784, sec. 13.
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practice in equity conform to that of the Supreme Court of the
United States. 7 None of the acts expressly conferred jurisdic-
tion on the courts in cases of quia timet or to remove cloud on
title to real estate, but the courts assumed that they were em-
powered to act in such cases under a clause giving jurisdiction
in cases of fraud, regarding "a pretended and colorable claim
as a fraud upon the real owner." 8 And it would be but a
logical step to extend the jurisdiction to preventing the rais-
ing of a cloud on title. There is no doubt but that the sale in
Mantz v. Kistler (supra), if consummated, would be a cloud
on the title of the owner of the land. And it is well settled
that the jurisdiction of equity lies to prevent the raising of a
cloud on title as well as to remove one already in existence.
The courts have, however, clung to the old practice, depart-
ing from it only so far as to grant a bill in equity to enjoin
the levy and sale of a wife's real estate by a creditor of her
husband's, on an execution against him, where the wife's right
to the land is clearly established. 10 Where there is a dispute as
to the wife's title, equity will not restrain the execution and
sale thereunder." It would seem, however, that even if the
present practice were to be considered as justifiable before tle
courts had equity jurisdiction, after this was conferred so as
to extend to a case like Mants v. Kistler, the courts should have
administered equitable principles under equitable forms, and
the old practice should have been abrogated as no longer neces-
sary. Had this been done, the question of title to lands seized
in execution would be determined before the sale under execu-
tion, and, not only would the real owner of the land seized for
another's debt be relieved from hardship, but in cases where
there was no dispute as to title involved, bidders would know
just what was to be sold, and would bid understandingly, so
that, whereas, now, a property is sold at a sheriff's sale at a
great sacrifice, the amount realized from the sale would then
more nearly approach the real value of the realty, thus bene-
fitting both debtor and creditor. It may well be that the courts
at this day do not feel at liberty to remedy the defect, and it is
therefore submitted that the practice now in vogue should be
changed by legislative enactment and the practice prevailing in
'Act of February i4, 1854, P. L. 39, sec. I.
'Act of June 16, 1836, P. L 784, sec. 13.
'Thompson's Appeal, 107 Pa. 559.
'Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence, vol. 4 (3d Ed.), sec. 1398, note
i, and cases there cited.
"Hunter's Appeal, 40 Pa. 195.
'Winch's Appeal, 61 Pa. 424.
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equity substituted. But even if the courts do not care to go
the whole length of restraining the sale when the land is
claimed by one other than the debtor, and the title is in dispute,
there is no reason why the rule enjoining the sale of a wife's
lands, seized on an execution against her husband, but to which
she has fully established her title, should not be extended to
cases where a stranger to the defendant in the execution fully
establishes his rights in the land levied on, and seeks to prevent
his land from being sold to satisfy a debt not his own.
CAN A CORPORATION ExIST WITHOUT STOCKHOLDERS?
In general there may be said to be two theories concerning
the nature of a corporation. (I) That it is a legal entity dis-
tinct from the members whb compose it, or (2) that it is a
collecton or association of natural persons formed for certain
legal purposes.
Under the second theory the very definition makes stock-
holders necessary for corporate existence.
Under the first theory when the legal or artificial person is
spoken of, it is simply because the corporation is looked at from
one point of view, that is viewing one result of incorporation.
To argue that as a result of incorporation there is an entity
formed, and then to say that the entity can exist without the
component parts of which it is made up would be clearly a
fallacy.
A corporation is but an association and it would be a contra-
diction in terms to speak of an association existing without
associates composing it.'
In the recent case of In re Western Branch v. Trust Com-
pany,2 the stockholders of the Western Bank unanimously
agreed to increase their capital stock from $200,oo to $500,000.
On the same day the board of directors took the necessary steps
looking to the subscription for an issuance of this stock. All
the original shares of stock were retired and there were issued
in their stead new shares. There intervened a short period
of time between the retirement of the old issue and the issu-
ing of the new.
It was contended by creditors who sought to have the Bank
declared a partnership and the members bankrupt, that dur-
ing this interval there were no stockholders and consequently
the corporation came to an end.
'I Morawetz, Private Corporations, 33.
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A statute in the jurisdiction provides, that a corporation
shall exist from the moment that the certificate of incorporation
is filed with the Secretary of State.
The Court says: "The City Bank of Sherman [the name
under which the Western Bank became incorporated] as a
corporation was brought into existence by the granting of its
charter. Its charter was a franchise right to be exercised by
those entitled under the law to exercise it. It existed before
there were stockholders so that its existence does not depend
upon the existence of technical stockholders."
From the report of the case it is not clear what acts were
performed when the old stock was retired and the new stock
issued. But there does not seem to be any reason why if all
the stockholders agreed to retire their stock with intent that it
should be re-issued, they thereby ceased to be stockholders.
One or more of the stockholders, it is conceivable, could
surrender their rights in the corporate property to the corpora-
tion 3 taking in return merely a promise from the corporation
to issue to them at a certain date in the future new shares. In
this interval those who surrendered their stock would not have
rights which they could enforce against the corporation pro -
erty either at law or in equity. In this case the persons sur-
rendering their property rights would have given them up to
the other stockholders. But if all the stockholders unanimously
gave up their rights, taking merely a promise in return, the
question arises as to who is now the owner of the corporate
property. Surely the answer must be that the associates have
not in reality given up their property rights at all. Their cer-
tificates of stock may have been destroyed, but they would still
be stockholders in the sense that they each had property rights
in the corporation property.4
But let us assume, as the Court appears to have done, that
there were in fact no stockholders during the interval.
The statute in the jurisdiction provides that " the existence
of the corporation shall date from the filing of the charter in the
office of the Secretary of State." Therefore in some sense it
must be admitted that the corporation existed prior to the exist-
ence of stockholders. But this existence could only be in
name.
5
It has been held that the acts of the signers of the certificate
of incorporation done in the corporate name, have bound the
2 163 Federal Rep. 713.
'Taylor, Priv. Corp. 136.
' Cattle Co. v. Burns, 82 Texas, 56.
'I Morawetz, 33.
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corporation when later fully organized. Such a corporation
has been held to be capable of holding property," and capable
of issuing promissory notes.7  But on the other hand not
capable of being a party to a contract.8
The principal case then holds that the existence of a corpora-
tion in name alone is sufficient to keep that corporation alive
during an interval between the retirement of old stock and the
issuance of new, when in that interval there are no stockholders.
IS A COMMUNICATION BY A COMMERCIAL AGENCY PRIVILEGED?
The question as to the liability of a mercantile agency for
libel in case of an honest though erroneous expression of
opinion was raised in the recent case Mackintosh v. Dunn, L.
R. (19o8) App. Cas. 39 o . An action was brought against the
defendant and others who conducted a commercial agency for
damages resulting from the publication of two libels which
concerned the plaintiffs in respect to their business. The de-
fendant's business was the usual one of commercial agencies,
that of obtaining information with reference to the commercial
standing and position of persons and of communicating such
information confidentially to subscribers to the agency in re-
sponse to specific and confidential inquiries. The single ques-
tion presented to the court was whether the occasion on which
the admitted libels were published was or was not a privileged
one. The House of Lords held the occasion not a privileged
one although no carelessness or ill faith was alleged on the part
of the defendant company. The Court cited the opinion of
Parke, B., in the case of Toogood v. Spyring' as the settled
law in regard to the publication of information injurious to
the character or business of another: "The law considers such
publications as malicious, unless it is fairly made by a person
in the discharge of some public or private duty, whether legal
or moral, or in the conduct of his own affairs in matters where
his interest is concerned. In such cases the occasion prevents
the inference of malice. If fairly warranted by any occasion
or exigency, and honestly made, such communications are pro-
tected for the common convenience and welfare of society."
The Court holds that the underlying principle is "the common
'Coyote v. Ruble, 8 Ore. 284, 293.
'National Bank v. Texas Co., 74 Tex. 421, 435.
"Aspen W. & L. Co. v. Aspen, 5 Colo. App. 12, 18.1 1 C. M. & R. I81.
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convenience and welfare of society," not the convenience of
individuals or the convenience of a class; or as held by Erle,
C. J.,2 "the general interests of society." After having stated
that in their opinion the motive of the defendant company in
furnishing the information was not a sense of public duty
but one of self interest, of a business carried on as other busi-
nesses are, in the hope of profit, the Court put the real ques-
tion in issue: "Is it in the interests of the community, is it for
the welfare of society, that the protection which the law throws
around communications made in legitimate self-defense, or
from a bona fide sense of duty, should be extended to com-
munications made from motives of self-interest, by persons
who trade for profit in the characters of other people?" The
question is answered by the Court in the negative and the
occasion held not a priveleged one, the communication being
made from motives of self interest and not made in the general
interests of society and from sense of duty.
The utility of commercial agencies of the sort of which the
defendant company is a class seems to have been overlooked by
the Court. That the utility of such a commercial agency -is
great can hardly be denied when we conceive the vast place
such agencies hold in the commercial world. Neither the em-
ployer nor the employee can well dispense with such agencies.
The courts in America have never questioned their utility, but
on the contrary have always recognized the great impulse which
such agencies have given to business. The courts have, how-
ever, held with equal consistency that their utility is dependent
on their confidential limitations. In general the American courts
have held that confidential communications of information to
its customers by a commercial agency, bona fide, and without
malice or recklessness, are privileged.8
Many of the American cases make the question of privilege
depend upon the care used in the selection of agents and in
the gathering and dissemination of the information.4 Thus it
is consistently held that if the information is given out publicly
or is written on printed sheets and sent out to subscribers
generally without regard to their interests in the parties named
therein the communication is not privileged;5 but if given in
good faith on request of subscribers having a present interest
'Whitely v. Adams, I5 C. B. (N. S.) 392.
'Beardsley v. Tappan, 5 Batchf. 497; Eber v. Dunn, 12 Fed. 526;
Trunell v. Scarlett, 18 Fed. 214; Ormsby v. Douglas, 37 N. Y. 477;
State v. Lonsdale, 48 Wis. 348; King v. Patterson, 49 N. J. Law, 417;
Billings v. Russell, 8 Boston Law Reports (N. S.), 699;. Pollock v.
Munchner, 81 Mich. 280; Mitchell v. Bradstreet, ix6 Mo. 226; Brad-
street v. Gill, 72 Texas, 115.
"Locke v. Bradstreet, 22 Fed. Rep. 771; Com. v. Stacey, 8 Phila.
Rep. 617.
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in the person and his business to whom the inqury relates, it
is privileged.3
It is quite universal law that the giving of confidential com-
munications to a principal by an agent employed to procure in-
formation as to the solvency, credit, and standing of another,
if given in good faith, is privileged.8 If one merchant may
thus employ his own private agent to seek and communicate
such information, what legal objection can there be to a com-
bination or union of two or more in the employment of the
same agency? And, as a consequence, if an agent may act for
several, he may make the pursuit of such information his oc-
cupation, and the question before the House of Lords as to
whether the defendant was pursuing the business for gain
would not affect the right.7 The question in the minds of the
Americafn court is not whether the informant may have a
motive of self-gain, but rather whether or not he acts carefully
and honestly. The greater number of such agencies in the
United States possibly accounts for the conflict of opinion be-
tween American and English courts. It is hard to see how-
ever why the mere fact that an individual or a company
realizes compensation for their information should make the
communication of that information, under faithful and con-
fidential limitations, not to the interest and welfare of society.
Surely a contrary opinion can hardly be held in the light of
present commercial conditions.
TRANSFER OF A RIGHT OF ACTION FROM A VENDOR OF CHAT-
TELS TO HIS VENDEE.
In Eshleman v. Union Stock Yard Co.,' by a per curiam
decision, the Court sustained the ruling of the lower court re-
fusing recovery from the defendant, the owner of public stock-
yards, for the death of certain cattle, due to Texas fever al-
leged to have been contracted through negligence, in the pens
of the defendant by cattle owned by the plaintiff's vendor and
by them communicated to other cattle of the plaintiff which
died. It was held that, even assuming that the defendant
knew of the presence of "ticks" in his pens and that through
negligence the disease had been contracted by the cattle there,
yet no right 'of action for negligence could pass through the
vendor to the plaintiff, the vendee.
'Sunderland v. Bradstreet, 46 N. Y. 188; Taylor v. Church, 4 Seld.
452.
'Washburn v. Cook, 3 Denio, IIO.
'Ormsby v. Douglas, 37 N. Y. 477.
12=2 Pa. 20 (I908).
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The decision appears proper upon the facts proved and the
law announced has no discovered decision against it nor any
decision definitely to support the above dicta. If a right of
action had accrued to the vendor, his mere sale of the cattle
would not have transferred that right to his vendee. Such
right could have passed only by sufficient assignment or de-
scent.2 It is perhaps deciding the point by an assumption in
saying a right of action had accrued to the vendor and so
none could accrue to his vendee.
The reasoning in the old cases of seduction,8 which appears
most nearly analogous to the facts in question, should not be
extended into the general law of tort. The modem tendency
is to break down those barriers which prevent recovery by one
who has been injured directly or consequentially, yet proxi-
mately, through the negligence or default of another. He, who
was at fault, should repay the injury of another without fault,
and refined reasoning should not bar.
It is now well established that where one knowingly or
fraudulently sells an article imminently dangerous 4 to human
life, he is liable to any subsequent vendee or other who is in-
jured thereby while not at fault. His liability for negligence
or deliberate act to his vendee might be based on contract yet
others may recover because of breach of duty to the public
generally. Knowledge of such condition must generally be
proven. So one who sells a folding bed knowing of its danger-
ous condition is liable to a third person injured;6 or he who
knowingly sells a horse diseased with glanders is liable for
the death of an attendant.7 So also where the contract of sale
is declared simply as an inducement but the cause of action is
based not upon the contract but upon the injury received by a
party contemplated in the contract through the defendant's
negligence, recovery is allowed.8 Where one labels a drink as
harmless and refreshing and through negligence particles of
glass are in the bottles sold, the person injured has a cause of
action though knowledge be not proven.9
'North v. Turner, 9 S. & R. 244 (1823).
'Blaymire v. Haley, 6 M. & W. 55 (184o); i Shear and Red on
Neg. I16.
'Standard v. Wakefield, lO2 Va. 824 (29o4); Elkins v. McKean,
79 Pa. 493 (1875); i Thompson on Negligence 817, et seq.
'Benjamine on Sales, 431.
'Lewis v. Ferry, iii Cal. 39 (I896).
'Hartlove v. Fox, 79 Md. 514 (894).
I George v. Skivington, L. R. 5, Exch. i (i69).
'Watson v. Augusta Brewing Co., 124 Ga. 121 (1905).
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Thus it appears that though the law fastens on the vendor
no general or public duty arising out of his contract, for a
breach of which he can be held liable by those not in privity
with him;'1 yet there may be a cause of action to another
based upon the breach of duty entirely aside from the terms
of the contract. Thus where one railroad company negligently
furnishes a defective car to a second company, the first com-
pany owes a duty of care to the employees of the second."
Whenever one person supplies goods, or machinery or the like
for the purpose of their being used by another person under
such circumstances that every one of ordinary semse would, if
he thought, recognize at once that unless he used ordinary
care and skill with regard to the condition of the thing sup-
plied or the mode of supplying it, there will be danger of in-
jury to the person or property of him for whose use the thing
is supplied and who is to ise it, a duty arises to use ordinary
care and skill as to the condition or manner of supplying such
thing.12
Under the modem economic conditions of rapid change of
ownership of chattels, real or personal, the mere fact that the
seeds of the resulting injury have been planted in property
when owned by one person to develop into an injury when the
property is owned by another, should not of itself affect or
bar the right of that other to recover from the person whose
negligence was the proximate cause thereof. In the principal
case, the defendant was bound not only to use due care, but
to possess a competent share of skill as one who undertook to
perform a public business.' The plaintiff was one of the
regular customers, a person in contemplation. Had the
negligence resulted in the cattle contracting the germs one
hour later, after the sale, there would be no doubt of the
plaintiff's right to recover. That the plaintiff bought im-
mediately thereafter did not lessen the defendant's fault nor
increase the plaintiff's compensation and should not affect the
liability or recovery. Even if good legal reasoning could not
support the cause of action, sound public policy, in such an
imminently dangerous practice, as in the case cf sales, should
have raised a duty to the public generally and allowed re-
covery."
"0Davidson v. Nichols, 93 Mass. 518 (1866).
"P. R. R. v. Snyder, 55 Ohio St. 342 (1896).
"Heaven v. Pender, L. R. ii, Q. B. D. 5o3 (1883).
'Spencer v. Campbell, 9 W. & S. 32 (1845).
"Herrick v. Gray, 65 Ill. 10, (1872); Grimes v. Eddy, 126 Mo.
168 (1894).
